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Callahan: Professional Responsibility
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

STOP THE PRESSES! THE QUATTLEBAUM

DOCTRINE: IMPOSING PRIOR RESTRAINTS TO
KEEP ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS OUT OF THE HEADLINES
"No right ranks higher than the right of the accused to afairtrial."
I.

INTRODUCrION

You are sitting in jail awaiting trial for murder. Fellow inmates crowd
the common area as you all try to watch the news. Suddenly, your own face
appears on the television screen talking to your lawyer. You and the other
prisoners listen to you pour your heart out, divulging to the attorney every
minute detail of your actions the night of the murder. The guards whisper and
snicker.
Yes, your lawyer had promised that your conversations with him
would be a secret. Yes, he had assured you that the jail's interrogation room
was safe from prying eyes and cupped ears. But the jailer broke the law. With
a hidden camera and microphone, a deputy sheriff secretly videotaped your
conversations, and that videotape fell into the hands of the largest television
station in the state, which will soon relay it to nearly every potential juror in
your area. Oh, and in case anybody misses the several television airings, your
entire interview with your attorney will also be printed in tomorrow morning's
newspaper.
Your lawyer did what he could to stop the broadcast; he asked the
judge to prevent the television station from broadcasting the tape. However,
the judge refused, explaining that the right of the press to publish anything it
wanted was more important than your right to talk privately to your lawyer
while facing a trial for your life.
This drama could unfold in any state in the Union except South
Carolina. In State-Record Co. v. State (Quattlebaum)' the South Carolina
Supreme Court marked the boundary beyond which freedom of the press
cannot impede the constitutional right to a fair trial. The South Carolina

*Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1), 464 U.S. 501, 508
(1984).
1. 332 S.C. 346, 504 S.E.2d 592 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1355 (1999).
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Supreme Court upheld a "prior restraint ' against the media's publishing of a
government agent's surreptitious recording of a privileged conversation
between a criminal defendant and the defendant's attorney.3
Quattlebaumis a salvo on the front lines of the battle between the First
Amendment rights to free press and free speech4 and a criminal defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. 5 Unddr the Fourteenth Amendment, the
states must abide by both the First and Sixth Amendments in all state actions.6
The United States Supreme Court created the modem demarcation line between
the two rights in 1976. In Nebraska PressAss'n v. Stuart7 the Supreme Court
affirmed that "'[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a
'heavy presumption" against its constitutional validity."' 8 Since that decision,
the Supreme Court has allowed only one prior restraint against publication to
remain intact for the purpose of protecting a criminal defendant's right to a fair
trial.9 That sole exception, like Quattlebaum, involved a purloined taperecorded conversation between a criminal defendant and his attorney. The

2. A "prior restraint" is distinguishable from a "gag order," although the two terms
are sometimes used interchangeably. A "gag order" prohibits persons privy to confidential
information (such as parties in a case, attorneys, police officers, and court officials) from
revealing information to outsiders, especially the media. However, it does not prohibit
publication by the press of information the press obtains. A "prior restraint" is far more
restrictive, prohibiting the press from publishing information which it possesses or may obtain.
See id. at 350 n.7, 504 S.E.2d at 594 n.7.
3. See id. at 350, 504 S.E.2d at 594.
4. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. This prohibition extends to the executive branch and, more
recently (since 1968), to the judiciary, as well as to Congress. See Quattlebaum,332 S.C. at 360
n.2, 504 S.E.2d at 599 n.2 (Toal, J., concurring and dissenting). While the application of the First
Amendment to judicial prior restraints is settled, see Carroll v. President &Comm'rs of Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), the modem extension of the original constitutional mandate helps
distinguish circumstances where prior restraints may be constitutional. See Quattlebaum,332
S.C. at 359,504 S.E.2d at 599 ("At the outset, itis essential to understand that all prior restraints
are not equal.").
5. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed.. and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976) ("Because 'trial by
jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme ofjustice,' the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the same right in state criminal prosecutions.")
(quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283
U.S. 697, 707 (1931) ("Itis no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press, and of speech,
is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
invasion by state action.").
7. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
8. Id. at 558 (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419
(1971)).
9. See United States v. Noriega (Noriega I), 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss4/11

2

Callahan: Professional Responsibility

1999]

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

defendant was former Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega."
Unfortunately, factual and procedural peculiarities in the Noriegacase renders
it an uncertain precedent."
In Part II, this Note outlines the facts of Quattlebaum.Parts I and IV
then review the purposes and treatment over the past two hundred years of the
First Amendment right to a free press and the Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial, respectively, as well as related constitutional-law and common-law
keystones. Part Vjuxtaposes the traditional conflict between the First and Sixth
Amendments regarding impartial juries with the additional issues encountered
when the debated publication consists of privileged communications.
The examination which follows reveals that while the freedom of the
press is always fervently guarded, it has never been held to be an absolute right
over all other individual rights and societal interests. On the other hand, a
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial has always been absolute and never
subordinate to any other right or societal interest, even if the Supreme Court
occasionally bends the meaning of "fair" to accommodate the exigencies of a
particular case. NebraskaPressprovides a necessary leash against trial courts
using a heavy hand to restrain generalized media activity in high-profile
criminal cases. But NebraskaPressis ill-suited to guide a trial court faced with
the potential publication of specific information devastating to the judicial
process, such as the disclosure of attorney-client confidences. The South
Carolina Supreme Court in Quattlebaum, just like the court in Noriega ,
correctly distinguished such limited circumstances from the sweeping restraints
that Nebraska Presswas designed to resolve, as outlined in the analysis of the
Quattlebaum decision in Part VI.
In Part VII, this Note suggests a system more precise than that afforded
by NebraskaPress and more true to the protection of individual rights. This
system is one that future courts could employ when faced with the unique
conflict between the First Amendment right to a free press and a criminal

10. See id.; see also MATTHEW D. BUNKER, JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA: RECONCILING
FAIR TRIALS AND AFREE PRESS 75 (1997) ("Apparently, the only reported case since Nebraska
Pressin which federal courts have upheld arestrainton criminal justice-related material already
in the hands of the press is U.S. v. Noriega.").But cf.KUTV, Inc. v. Willinson, 686 P.2d 456,
458,462 (Utah 1984) (upholding a trial court's restraint against media publication ofallegations
that acriminal defendant was connected to the Mafia). The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
has recently considered the same issues in State v. Huskey, No. 03C01-981 1-CR-00410, 1999
WL 39507 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29,1999). InHuskey a trial court restrained alocalnewspaper
from publishing information garnered from purloined records of the court-appointed defense
counsel's time sheets showing activities, experts, and costs, all ofwhichreflected evidencebeing
gathered, persons being interviewed, and otherinformation indicative oftrial strategy and tactics.
See id. at * 1-*2. The court held that without copies of the defense attorney's records at issue it
could not perform the analysis required by NebraskaPress,nor could it determine the scope of
any injunction which might bejustified. Because neither party had submitted the records for the
court's review, despite several opportunities, the grant of extraordinary appellate review was
dismissed as improvident. See id. at *7-*8.
11. See Quattlebaum, 332 S.C. at 357-58, 504 S.E.2d at 598.
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defendant's interests under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in protected
attorney-client confidences.
II.

THE ROOTS OF THE QUATLEBAUM SAGA

In May 1995, Lexington County police arrested twenty-five-year-old
B.J. Quattlebaum for murder, first degree burglary, armed robbery, and related
offenses all stemming from a single incident.' 2 While detained in the Lexington
County Detention Center, he met privately with local defense counsel Jack
Duncan.' 3 No party disputes that this meeting was protected by the attorneyclient privilege.' 4 Subsequently, the Lexington County solicitor indicted
Quattlebaum and sought the death penalty. 5 Quattlebaum's case was docketed
for November 1997,16 and Joseph McCulloch assumed duty as Quattlebaum's
lead counsel. As trial approached, McCulloch repeatedly demanded discovery

from the prosecution." Finally, in August 1997, the prosecution provided
partial discovery which included a videotape, previously unknown to the

defense, of the jailhouse attorney-client conference a year earlier between
Quattlebaum and Duncan.'" A member of the Lexington Country Sheriffs
Department made the videotape through surreptitious electronic eavesdropping
without either Quattlebaum's or Duncan's knowledge.' 9

12. Id. at 347-48, 504 S.E.2d at 593; Clif LeBlane, Deputy's Videotaping Trial
Postponed,THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Sept. 25, 1998, at B3.
13. John Allard, S.C. Supreme Court Upholds Gag Order,THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Sept. 1, 1998, at BI. This was Quattlebaum's first meeting with Duncan after being
arrested. See Quattlebaum, 332 S.C. at 361, 504 S.E.2d at 600 (Toal, J., concurring and
dissenting).
14. Quattlebaum, 332 S.C. at 348 n.1, 504 S.E.2d at 593 n.l.
15. Id. at 348, 504 S.E.2d at 593.
16. See Record on Appeal at 13.
17. See id. at41.
18. See id.
19. See id.
at 41-42,43. The FBI investigated the videotaping incident at the request
of the trial judge. See Allard, supra note 13, at B1. Three detectives (deputy sheriffs) and a
deputy solicitor were implicated in the rogue videotaping of Quattlebaum and Duncan. See
LeBlanc, supra note 12, atB3. Federal prosecutors indicted one deputy sheriff, David Grice, for
wiretapping and related charges in the Quattlebaum matter and in an incident involving another
defendant and counsel. See United States v. Grice, No. Crim. 3:98-759-19, 1998 WL 999907
(D.S.C. Nov. 12, 1998). Counsel for Quattlebaum moved to exclude the audio contents of the
tape from Grice's trial or, in the alternative, to close that portion of the trial to the press if the
audio contents were presented. Id. at *1. The district court held that the videotape, the federal
prosecutor's key evidence against the deputy sheriff, could not be admitted in the deputy's trial.
District Court Judge Shedd did not need to rely on Quattlebaum's constitutional rights; rather,
he found that the exclusionary rule of 18 U.S.C. § 2515 prohibited the Government from using
any illegally obtained wiretap in any trial, including a trial of a defendant wiretapper, without
the permission of the victim of the wiretap. See id. at * 1-*2 & *1 n.4. Congress enacted the
statute to protect the privacy of the victim of the illegal wiretapping. The particular wiretapping
involved in Grice invaded "one of the most private communications recognized in this country:
a privileged attorney-client conversation," and its use by the Government, "even in a closed
courtroom setting, may [have] prejudice[d] Quattlebaum's right to a fair retrial." Id. at *2. Judge

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss4/11

4

Callahan: Professional Responsibility

1999]

PROFESSIONAL RSPONSIBILITY

By August 18, McCulloch learned that at least one media outlet, WIS
Television, held a copy of the videotape," although WIS authorities promised
to air only the video portion without the audio.2 Nevertheless, McCulloch
moved for an immediate ex parte temporary restraining order, in pursuit of a
permanent injunction, to enjoin the prosecutor, defense, law enforcement

officials, "and any media or news agency, in particular WIS-TV, from the
airing, reporting, specifically characterizing or disseminating... the audio
contents" of the tapes.' The Deputy Solicitor for the Eleventh Circuit, which
includes Lexington County, consented to the motion.2 McCullochprovided the
court with a copy of the videotape for in camera review, where it remained
under seal.24

That afternoon, the circuit judge presiding over the case, Judge
Thomas W. Cooper, Jr., issued a temporary restraining order, pending further

hearing, prohibiting "all participants, including prosecution, law enforcement,
the defense, and all media.., from disseminating the substance and details of
the privileged communication between [Quattlebaum] and his counsel."' Judge
Cooper later reported that prior to signing the order he spoke with WIS-TV's
news director, explained the proposed order to him, and received confirmation
that WIS would not publish the restrained matters.26 Judge Cooper also

Shedd ordered the case against Grice held in abeyance until the United States could appeal. Id.
at *3.Observers expect a year delay. See, e.g., ClifLeBlanc, Videotaping Trial Postponed Up
To I Year, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Nov. 10, 1998, at B3. Deputy Grice was not charged
with a third incident of secretly recording another defendant and his attorney because federal
prosecutors deemed that incident "an honest mistake." LeBlanc, supra note 12, at B3.
20. See Record on Appeal at 42.
21. See id. The State, a South Carolina newspaper, subsequently reported that it too
"did not plan at the time to publish the contents [of the conversation]." See Allard, supra note
13, at Bl.
22. Record on Appeal at 39 (emphasis added). The motion requested prohibition of
only the audio soundtrack, not the video. See id. at 39-40. The motion and subsequent order did
not prevent the media from reporting the existence of the tapes, nor the pictures from them; it
prevented only the broadcast of the actual conversation recorded between Quattlebaum and his
defense counsel. See id. at 4-5, 39-40. Before learning that the videotape had been leaked to the
media, McCulloch had filed a motion in limine asking the court to "limit[] the in-court and extrajudicial comments by the prosecution, law enforcement and defense" and to prevent the parties
from divulging the contents or characterization of the videotape. Id. at 43.
23. See id. at 40.
24. See id. at 18.
25. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Judge Cooper addressed the order to the Solicitor's
Office, the Sheriff's Department, and WIS-TV. See id. at 4. The South Carolina Supreme Court
held that The State "was 'in active concert' with WIS and had actual notice of the order so as to
be bound by it." State-Record Co. v. State (Quattlebaum), 332 S.C. 346, 350, 504 S.E.2d 592,
594 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1355 (1999). Because the order prohibited WIS from
"disseminating" the contents, and not merely from "broadcasting" the audio portion of the tape,
WIS and The State were also prohibited from transferring it to news media outside of the court's
jurisdiction. However, the temporary restraining order did not prohibit reporting of the
videotape's existence, its significance as a breach ofan attorney-client conversation, the identity
of the participants, or broadcast of the video without sound. See id. at 348, 504 S.E.2d at 593.
26. See Record on Appeal at 8.
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unsuccessfully attempted to contact Jay Bender, counsel for the South Carolina
Press Association and for State-Record Company, publisher of the major daily
newspaper in the region.27
The following day, Bender filed a motion on behalf of State-Record
Company to dissolve the order. He claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction
over the company and that "the order constituted an impermissible prior
restraint under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution."28 Judge Cooper conducted a hearing that afternoon, with Bender
arguing on behalf of State-Record Company to dissolve the restraining order
and McCulloch arguing on behalf of Quattlebaum to maintain the order.29
McCulloch decried the prosecution's invasion of the attorney-client privilege. 0
Judge Cooper denied State-Record Company's motion to dissolve the
temporary restraining order and instead specified that the order would remain
in effect until a jury was empaneled and sequestered.3'
At trial, the court convicted Quattlebaum of murder and other charges
and adjudged the death penalty.32 Quattlebaum appealed the conviction, in part
asserting an unfair trial because law enforcement officials recorded his
conversation with his attorney.33
Im.

AN UNSTOPPABLE FORCE: THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The first ten amendments to the United States Constitution became
collectively known as the Bill of Rights. The First Amendment responded to
the people's insistence on freedom to criticize the government, government
officials, and the political process. The citizens of the United States were eager
to avoid oppressive restrictions, woven throughout Europe's history, which
prevented criticism of the government, especially those requiring all proposed

27. See id.at 8-9. The State, published by State-Record Company, is Columbia's only
major daily newspaper.
28. Record on Appeal at 38. In later argument and on appeal, State-Record asserted
that the criminal trial court had neither subject matter nor in personamjurisdiction to enforce an
injunction against the newspaper. The court overruled these objections. See Quattlebaum, 332
S.C. at 349, 504 S.E.2d at 593-94. These issues are beyond the scope of this Note and are not
discussed further.
29. See Record on Appeal at 6-34. There is no record ofany participation by WIS-TV
in these or subsequent proceedings. The Solicitor's Office had consented to the motion for the
restraining order and the order itself. See id. at 5, 40. However, the Solicitor's Office
subsequently refused to appear at the hearing, asserting that "'they did not have a dog in that
fight."' Id. at 35.
30. See id. at 18. As noted earlier, the FBI's investigation implicated a deputy
solicitor in the videotaping incident. See supra note 19.
31. See Record on Appeal at 33.
32. Quattlebaum, 332 S.C. at 348 n.4, 504 S.E.2d at 593 n.4.
33. See Allard, supranote 13, at B1.
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publications to be approved by the government prior to distribution.34 The
guarantee of a free press was not a superfluous addition to the guarantee of free
speech.35 The right to a free press was included in the First Amendment

primarily "to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional
check on the three official branches. 3

6

Significant cases by the Supreme Court enforcing the protections
offered by the First Amendment did not emerge until the early twentieth
century.37 Until then, the few decisions rendered by federal and state courts
were generally "antagonistic to free speech claims., 31 Starting during World
War I, federal and state legislators passed anti-espionage acts to quash war
protestors who encouraged insubordination in the military and impeded
recruiting for the war effort.39 Challenges to these statutes created the "clear

and present danger" test espoused by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United
States.'" The same year, Justice Holmes dissented when the Supreme Court

upheld convictions for distributing pamphlets calling for strikes by munitions
workers.4 Further defining the requirement that the danger must be "present"
as well as "clear," Justice Holmes justified restraint on publication only where
the danger was so pervasive and imminent thdt there was not sufficient time for
it to be abated by countervailing publications and discourse.4'

34. In England, after the printing press was invented, publishers had to submit all
manuscripts for prior approval by "crown officials empowered to censor objectionable passages
and to approve or deny a license for the printing of the work." LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 8 (1960).
Censorship originally applied only to "false speech," but later expanded to cover a broad and
vague range of "dangerous utterances." Id. at7- 8.Prohibited speech included "heresy and other
religious crimes," "opinions deemed pernicious," and "seditious libel."Id. at 8, 10. Although the
priorrestraints imposed by the government disappeared in 1694, common-law criminal sanctions
continued against any publication deemed scandalous, derogatory, or contemptuous towards the
government or that would cause the government ridicule or scorn. See id. at 13.
35. "Ifthe Free Press guarantee meant no more than freedom of expression, it would
be a constitutional redundancy." Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631,633
(1974-1975).
36. Id. at 634.
37. "No important case involving free speech was decided by [the Supreme] Court
prior to Schenck v. UnitedStates, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
503 (1951).
38. MARC A. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW 29 n.* (2d ed.
1982).
39. See id. at 29.
40. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree.").
41. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
42. See id. at 630-31 ("Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to
leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping
command, 'Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech."') (alteration in
original).
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The freedom of the press grew in 1931 in Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson.' In that case, the Court struck down a Minnesota statute allowing
injunctions against any business which regularly or customarily produced
malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspapers, magazines, or other
periodicals." Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes held that the
constitutional guarantee of liberty of the press "'was intended to prevent all
such previous restraintsupon publications as had been practiced by other
governments, and in early times here, to stifle the efforts of patriots towards
4
enlightening their fellow subjects upon their rights and the duties of rulers.""'
While providing the foundation for the modem holdings of freedom of the
press, Near affirmed that "[l]iberty of speech, and of the press, is also not an
absolute right, and the State may punish its abuse."'
An absolutist approach to freedom of expression has always found
adherents, but has never been accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court.47
Instead, a balancing of the interests between the benefits of a free press and
other societal interests has evolved into a "two tiered approach," which
distinguishes between categoriesof speech.' Political speech regarding and,
in particular, criticizing the government mandates the highest protection of
freedom of expression,49 whereas non-political speech more readily yields to
other societal interests.50
The Supreme Court upheld the primacy of political speech criticizing
the government and distinguished it from less protected speech in New York

43. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
44. See id. at 722-23. The statute was used to shut down a virulently anti-Semitic
newspaper which routinely made scurrilous attacks on the competence and motives of local
public officials. See id. at 704; see alsoNebraska Press Ass'nv. Stuart 427 U.S. 539,556(1976)
(discussing Near).
45. Near, 283 U.S. at 717 (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.)
304, 313 (1825)).
46. Id. at 708.
47. See FRANKLIN, supra note 38, at 28-29, 35.
48. Id. at 35.
49. See supra text accompanying note 45.
50. Some types of speech are anathema to the interests of society and are never
protected. Justice Murphy expressed this view:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, theprofane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words-those which by their very
utterance inflict injury.... Ithasbeenwell observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are ofsuch slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (footnote omitted).
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Times Co. v. United States.5 ' The Court refused the United States Attorney
General's request to block publication of previously secret official reports
reflecting poorly on the government's conduct of the Vietnam War."2 To
distinguish the impermissible restraint sought by the government, members of
the Court expressly pointed out incidences where the government could
constitutionally restrain the press from publishing. For instance, Justice
Brennan agreed that unprotected speech is subject to prior restraint, not just
after-the-fact sanctions. He noted that obscenity could be subject to prior
restraints on publication."3 Justice White observed that the National Labor
Relations Board and the Federal Trade Commission are empowered to issue
cease-and-desist orders against publishing material deemed to be unfair to
workers or consumers, respectively.5 4 Justice White noted the distinction
between a private citizen's right to use government power to enjoin the press
in order to protect a private right and the government's attempt on its own
behalf to prevent publication about government operations. 5 Thus, the
government lawfully wields the power of prior restraint in numerous
circumstances, whether on behalf of the public at large or to protect the rights
and interests of individual citizens.
In a public address four years later, Justice Stewart explained the
constitutionally unique nature of "freedom of the press":
Most... provisions in, the Bill of Rights
protect specific liberties or specific rights of
individuals: freedom of speech, freedom of
worship, the right to counsel, the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, to
name a few. In contrast, the Free Press
Clause extends protection to an institution.
The publishing business is, in short, the
only organized private business that is given
explicit constitutional protection. 6
Accordingly, the Constitution specifically protects the "publishing business"
in order to protect the people from the government. However, nothing in the
Constitution grants the "publishing business" the right to run roughshod over
the "specific rights of individuals." This belief lays the foundation for the

51. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
52. The Supreme Court refused to uphold the United States Attorney General's
request for a temporary restraint on publication of a Pentagon study entitled "History of U.S.
Decision-Making Process on VietNam Policy." Id. at 714.
53. Id. at 726 n.* (Brennan, ., concurring).
54. Id. at 731 n.1 (White, J., concurring).
55. Id. (White, J., concurring) (referring to the right of private citizens to seek to
enjoin the press from publishing copyrighted material).
56. Stewart, supra note 35, at 633.
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conflict between the rights to a free press and to a fair trial.
IV.

ANUNsTOPPABLEFORCEMEETS AN IMMOVABLE OBJECT: THE RIGHT
TO A FAIR TRIAL

The Supreme Court has found the basis of the First Amendment in the
hypothesis that "speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda,
free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmentalpolicies.""7 However,
sole criminal defendants are rarely able to engage in such "free debate," having
little power or influence to have their voices heard. They are often constrained
by admonitions, so they say nothing lest they jeopardize their Sixth
Amendment guarantee to a fair trial.
In an early commentary on the conflict between the rights to a fair trial
and to a free press, Lord Ellenborough justified restricting the press from
publishing pretrial hearings:
If anything is more important than another
in the administration of justice, it is that
jurymen should come to the trial of those
persons on whose guilt or innocence they
are to decide, with minds pure and
unprejudiced. . . . [P]reliminary
examinations['] only tendency is to
prejudge those whom the law still presumes
to be innocent, and to poison the sources of
justice."
The first Congress proposed, and the states ratified, the Sixth Amendment as
one ofthe first ten amendments to the Constitution. "The common-law rule that
looked upon jurors as interested parties who could give evidence against a
defendant was explicitly rejected by the Sixth Amendment provision that a
defendant is entitled to be tried by an 'impartial jury."' 59
Trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme
ofjustice.' The essence of the American trial system is that "the conclusions

57. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951).
58. Rex v. Fisher, 170 Eng. Rep. 1253, 1255 (1811), quoted in Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 389-90 n.20 (1979).
59. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 385 (footnote omitted).
60. Notably, only the Sixth Amendment and, to a lesser degree, the Seventh
Amendment guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases, are directive; they mandate that the
government guarantee a process. Each of the other eight original amendments are restrictive;
they prohibit the government from taking certain actions. In Duncanv. Louisiana,391 U.S. 145
(1968), Justice White wrote for the court that a jury trial "is not necessarily fundamental to
fairness inevery criminal system that might be imagined.... A criminal process which was fair
and equitable but used no juries is easy to imagine." Id. at 150 n.14 (emphasis added). But, a fair
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to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open
court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public
print.",61 The judicial dilemma posed by prior restraints ordered to protect the
right to a fair trial is a modem phenomenon, dating only from 1976.62 The
jurisprudence regarding prior restraints evolved from the national security,
political, and personal sensibilities arenas.63 In these cases, the clash of
constitutional rights was not between two private parties; instead, a private
party's First Amendment claim conflicted with public (or at least government)
interests. With almost no instances of prior restraints involving criminal trials,
the conflict between the First Amendment and a defendant's right to a fair trial
is examined primarily in appeals of trials tainted by prejudicial publicity.
In Irvin v. Dowd" the Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction
that followed intensive, hostile, and pervasive news coverage. 65 Of 430 persons
called for jury duty, 370 expressed opinions ranging from "mere suspicion to
absolute certainty" that the defendant was guilty." Eight of the twelve selected
jurors admitted a predetermination of guilt, but were seated (over Irvin's
objection) after asserting that they could nevertheless render an impartial
verdict. 67 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "such a statement of
impartiality can be given little weight" where, surrounded by a "huge.., wave
of public passion," two-thirds of a jury admitted believing the defendant was
guilty before hearing any evidence.68 Justice Frankfurter concurred, noting that
the Court had not yet decided whether the media had a constitutional right to
create a miscarriage of justice by poisoning the minds of potential jurors.69
The Supreme Court's next significant opinion on the matter was an
eerie foreshadowing of Quattlebaum.In 1961, police arrested andjailed Walter
Rideau in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana on charges ofarmedrobbery, kidnaping,
and murder. 7' The following morning, the sheriff's department staged an
"interview"of Rideau, who, flanked by two state troopers, confessed his guilt

trial by jury was "fundamental in the context of the criminal processes maintained by the
American States." Id.
61. Patterson v. Colorado ex rel.Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
62. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976) ("None of our
decided cases on prior restraint involved restrictive orders entered to protect a defendant's right
to a fair and impartial jury .... ).
63. See id. at 556-58 (discussing several cases involving prior restraints).

64. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
65. The Court described the publicity as "a barrage of newspaper headlines, articles,
cartoons and pictures... unleashed against [Irvin] during the six or seven months preceding his
trial." Id. at 725. The trial judge granted one change of venue to the next county but, apparently
because of a statutory constraint, refused a request for a further change ofvenue even though the
new venue had been corrupted as well. See id. at 720.
66. Id. at 727.
67. Id. at 724, 727-28.
68. Id. at 728.
69. Id. at 730 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
70. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 723-24 (1963).
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in response to leading questions from the sheriff. This interview was filmed by
a television crew.7 During voir dire two months later, three members of the
jury stated that they had seen and heard the televised confession at least once."
The jury, which also included two local deputy sheriffs, convicted Rideau and
sentenced him to death.73
The Supreme Court reversed Rideau's conviction as a denial of due
process when the judge refused to change venue.74 Writing for the Court,
Justice Stewart characterized the televised confession as the actual trial in the
minds of the public and stated that "[a]ny subsequent court proceedings...
could be but a hollow formality. 75 The Supreme Court held, without requiring
any showingofactualprejudice,that due process requires that no person shall
be sent to death by a jury drawn from a community exposed to a televised
confession.76
The Supreme Court reinforced the doctrine of inherent obstruction of
due process by pretrial publicity following the trial of Billy Sol Estes,77 in
which the judge allowed live radio and television broadcasts of a pretrial
hearing regarding Estes's motion to prohibit the media from broadcasting and
recording the proceedings.78 In reversing Estes's later conviction, the Supreme
Court condemned pretrial publicity which "maybe more harmful than publicity
during the trial for it may well set the community opinion as to guilt or
' Writing for the Court, Justice Clark
innocence."79
noted the Rideau decision
"that the televising of a defendant in the act of confessing to a crime was
inherently invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
even withouta showing ofprejudice or a demonstrationofthe nexus between
the televised confession and the trial."'8 The Court found that it had a "duty to
continue to enforce the principles that from time immemorial have proven
efficacious andnecessary to a fair trial."'" The Estes Court also worried that the
media might intrude into confidential attorney-client conversations and

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id. at 724-25.
See id. at 725.
See id.
Id. at 726.
Id.

76. Id. at 727. Justice Clark, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented. He implied that he
would require a showing on the record that the adverse publicity had fatally infected the trial.
See id. at 729 (Clark, J., dissenting). Two years later, Justice Clark reversed his view in Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). See infranotes 77-82 and accompanying text.
77. Estes was a nationally known financier. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 552 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring).
78. See id.at 535-36. Prior to the trial, massive publicity led to a change of venue that
was 500 miles from the original site. Id. at 535. The media activities in the courtroom
considerably disrupted the pretrial hearings. Id. at 536.
79. Id. at 536.
80. Id. at 538 (emphasis added). Justice Clark, writing for the Court, cited his dissent
in Rideau as support for this proposition. See id.
81. Id. at 541.
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consequently deprive an accused of effective assistance of counsel.8 2
One year later, the Supreme Court likewise condemned the carnivallike trial of Dr. Sam Sheppard.' The "trial judge did not fulfill his duty to
protect [the defendant] from the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated
the community and to control disruptive influences in the courtroom."" The
SheppardCourt aimed most of its ire at the trial judge's refusal to exercise his
authority over the courtroom and the court's officers to prevent the "carnival
atmosphere.""5 Noting that "there is nothing that proscribes the press from
reporting events that transpire in the courtroom,"86 the Supreme Court in
Sheppardsuggested four actions that the trial court could have taken to mitigate
the preexisting publicity: (1) continuance; (2) change in venue; (3)
sequestration of the jury; and (4) a gag order on all counsel, parties, witnesses,
court officials, and government employees.8 Only the gag order was
prophylactic, as it was designed to prevent further damage rather than alleviate
the existing concerns. The other three actions were after-the-fact remedies
suggested only as methods which might, in some circumstances, mitigate the
prejudice from excessive publicity prior to trial.
The SheppardCourt did not imply that the foregoing options were the
only ones available to a court that is in a position to prevent undue prejudicial
publicity that seriously threatens the fairness of a trial. To the contrary,
commenting that "reversals are but palliatives," the Court admonished trial
judges to invoke "remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its
inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will
protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences.""8 The press may
escape such rules and regulations only so long as there is "'no threat ormenace

82. See id. at 549.
83. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Police suspected Sheppard of
bludgeoning his wife to death at their home. See id. at 335-36.
84. Id. at 363. The Supreme Court in Sheppard condemned, among a host of other
judicial misfeasances, the prosecutor and police leaking ostensible "evidence" to the media that
was unmistakably inadmissible. "The exclusion of such evidence in court is rendered
meaningless when news media make it available to the public." Id. at 360.
85. Id. at 358. Justice Clark used over 17 pages of a 30-page decision to recount the
atrocious activities, led by the coroner, the prosecutor, and the judge (the latter two in the midst
of a campaign for an election held two weeks after trial) in concert with the press, which
combined to destroy any semblance offairness or impartiality. Highlights included ordering the
defendant to reenact the event in his home and inviting the press to photograph the staged event;
denying the defendant the right to counsel during the coroner's inquest, which was held in a high
school gymnasium and used loudspeakers so that the crowd of reporters and spectators could
hear; filling the courtroom with reporters and photographers; placing a press room adjacent to
the jury room; and only mildly asking the non-sequestered jury to ignore the massive publicity.
See id. at 337-49, 353-57.
86. Id. at 362-63.
87. See id. at 361 (gag order); id. at 363 (continuance, change in venue, and
sequestration).
88. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
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to the integrity of the trial."'' 9 A trial judge has an obligation to warn reporters
as to the "impropriety" of publishing such prejudicial material.9" The Supreme
Court admonished the increasing frequency of unfair and prejudicial news
commentary on pending trials:
Due process requires that the accused
receive a trial by an impartial jury free from
outside influences. Given the pervasiveness
of modem communications and the
difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity
from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts
must take strong measures to ensure that the
balance is never weighed against the
accused.9
Therefore, the Sheppard Court clearly envisioned a trial judge having the
authority to restrain the press when necessary for a defendant to receive a fair
tha.92

Finally, in 1976 the Supreme Court decided its first case involving a
prior restraint imposed to protect a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury.
In Nebraska PressAss'n v. Stuart93 the Court decided the validity of a state
court's order that had been imposed to counter an expected media frenzy
regarding a pending criminal case. As such, the decision offers little to guide
a trial or appellate court where the threatened publicity is more acute and the
proposed remedy more precise.94 However, Nebraska Pressremains the only
Supreme Court decision directly addressing the use of prior restraints against
the media in order to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. It established the
test cited by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Quattlebaum.95
89. Id. at 350 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 377 (1947)).
at362. The Court excluded any matters placed on the record in open court
90. See id.
from its characterization of "impropriety." See id.
91. Id.
92. Chief Justice Warren noted in Estes that "the Sixth Amendment... not only
requires that the accused have certain specific rights but also that he enjoy them at a trial."Estes
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 559 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring). Therefore, the trial court's duty
is to "ensure" a fair trial, not merely "mitigate" influences which threaten a fair trial. See infra
notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
93. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
94. See State-Record Co. v. State (Quattlebaum), 332 S.C. 346,357 n.21, 504 S.E.2d
number
592,598 n.21 (1998) (referring specifically to the Noriegacase, the court noted that "[a]
of commentators have recognized misapplication of the Nebraska Presstest"), cert. denied, 119
S..Ct. 1355 (1999); id.at 361, 504 S.E.2d at 600 (Toal, J., dissenting) ("[S]uch tests really do not
give meaningful and practical guidance to trial judges."); see also Alberto Bemabe-Riefkohl,
Prior Restraintson the Media and the Right to a Fair Trial: A Proposalfor a New Standard,
84 KY. L.J. 259, 267 (1995-96) ("The standard created by the Supreme Court... has proven to
be inoperable and confusing .... ).
95. See Quattlebaum, 332 S.C. at 353, 504 S.E.2d at 595-96.
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In Nebraska Press,the Nebraska Press Association and other media
representatives appealed a restraining order initially imposed by a trial court
following the arrest of a suspect in the murder of a small-town family.96 As
amended by the Nebraska Supreme Court, the order prohibited all media
outlets from publishing any matters regarding "(a) the existence and nature of
any confessions or admissions made by the defendant to law enforcement
officers, (b) any confessions or admissions made to any third parties, except
members of the press, and (c) other facts 'strongly implicative' of the
accused."'9 The order was to expire when the jury was impaneled. 9s
Writing for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger opined that
"pretrial publicity presents few unmanageable threats to [the] important right"
to a fair trial "[i]n the overwhelming majority of criminal trials."99 He
envisioned such threats coming from sensational cases that develop
"tensions... between the right of the accused to trial by an impartial jury and
the rights guaranteed others by the First Amendment.""le ° Burger cited Irvin,
Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard to outline the impermissible prejudice resulting
when a trial court allows the press free rein in judicial proceedings.' ° ' But to
determine whether a court may constitutionally restrain the media in order to
prevent that impermissible prejudice, Chief Justice Burger fashioned a threepronged test consisting of the following factors: "(a) the nature and extent of
pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely to mitigate
the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) how effectively a
restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened danger."' 2
The Court agreed that the trial judge reasonably concluded that intense
and pervasive pretrial publicity would exist, which could impinge upon the
defendant's right to a fair trial, thus meeting the first prong. 3 But the Court
faulted the trial judge for stopping there and not making findings as to "whether

96. See Nebraska Press,427 U.S. at 543. The prosecutor and defense counsel had

joined in asking the trial judge to issue a restrictive order to distinguish'"matters that may or may
not be publicly reported or disclosed to the public." Id. at 542. No representative of the press
attended the hearing. Id. The trial court apparently went beyond the motion's request to define

restrictions on what the attorneys and police in the case could report or disclose and added the
restraint against the media from publishing anything not countenanced by the ostensibly
voluntary Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines. See id. These guidelines proscribed the publication
of "confessions, opinions on guilt or innocence, statements thatwould influence the outcome of
a trial, the results of tests or examinations, comments on the credibility of witnesses, and

evidence presented in the jury's absence." Id. at 542-43 n.1. The district court amended the
order, but still prohibited the press from reporting on a wide range of matters, including the exact
nature of the restrictive order itself. See id. at 543-44. The press associations appealed to the
Nebraska Supreme Court. See id. at 544.
97. Id. at 545.
98. See id. at 546.
99. Id. at551.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 551-53.
102. Id. at 562.

103. See id. at 562-63.
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measures short of an order restraining all publication" would suffice. t ' As
potential measures, the Court listed the alternatives suggested in Sheppard: (a)
change in venue; (b) continuance to allow public attention to subside; (c)
extensive voir dire; (d) sequestration of jurors; and (e) gag orders on parties,
counsel, police, and witnesses."0 5 Accordingly, the Court held there were
neither findings nor evidence in the record sufficient to meet the second
prong."° The Court further found that the order failed the third, "effectiveness
prong."'' 7 In addition to failing the new three-pronged test, the order also
impermissibly restricted publication of testimony produced in an open
preliminary hearing.' Finally, the Court deemed as too vague and broad the
portion of the order restricting publicity of information which would implicate
the defendant.' 9
The Nebraska PressCourt reached the right decision in a case where
the order was (1) vague and broad, (2) substantially applied to information
heard in open court, and (3) justified primarily by conditions which would be
found in every high-visibility and sensational trial."' But the Court went far
beyond what was necessary under the facts of the case by developing a test
virtually guaranteed to sacrifice an individual citizen's right to a fair trial."'
Further, the NebraskaPress Court seemed to convert the last-resort measures
for mitigating damage from already existing prejudicial publicity into
alternative measures which a court must take instead of "prevent[ing] the
prejudice at its inception."". Nevertheless, the Nebraska Press Court
grudgingly acknowledged that not all prior restraints are unconstitutional when
required to protect the right to a fair trial:
However difficult it may be, we need not

104. Id. at 563.
105. See id. at 563-64 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966)).
106. See id. at 565.
107. See id. at 565-66.
108. See id. at 568.
109. See id. In his concurrence, Justice White expressed "grave doubt... whether
orders with respect to the press such as were entered in this case would ever be justifiable." Id.
at 570-71 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). But three members of the Court found an
absolute First Amendment right at the expense of the Sixth Amendment. See id.at 572 (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("The right to a fair trial ... is unquestionably one of the most precious and
sacred safeguards enshrined in the Bill of Rights. I would hold, however, that resort to prior
restraints on the freedom of the press is a constitutionally impermissible method for enforcing
that right ....).
Justice Brennan fully described the process and rationale used in developing the
S110.
order. See id. at 574-79 (Brennan, J., concurring).
111. The case could have been reversed merely because the order was vague and
overly broad and because it impermissibly restrained publication oftestimony presented in open
court. In Quattlebaumthe South Carolina Supreme Court agreed that the second prong, requiring
that there be no other measures that would "mitigate" the effects, is an impossible standard to
meet if literally applied. See infra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
112. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
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rule out the possibility of showing the kind
of threat to fair trial rights that would
possess the requisite degree of certainty to
justify restraint. This Court has frequently
denied that First Amendment rights are
absolute and has consistently rejected the
proposition that a prior restraint can never
be employed." 3
At best, "NebraskaPress left the door ajar, but only slightly, to prior
restraints in other areas,""' 4 although it was sufficiently open for the Utah
Supreme Court to uphold a prior restraint in a criminal case in KUT, Inc. v.
Wilkinson. " s While a jury was being empaneled in the trial of a defendant
charged with four counts of felony theft, the trial court restrained the local
media from publishing allegations that the defendant was tied to organized
crime." 16 The Utah Supreme Court upheld the order after noting the meticulous
fact-finding by the trial court which met Nebraska Press's three-prong
standard." 7 In particular, the trial court had considered and rejected alternative
measures short of issuing the restraint."" Citing a Utah "constitutional direction
that '[n]o law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of
the press,"' 9 the Utah Suprene Court added a fourth prong to the Nebraska
Presstest: the public's interest in having immediate access to the information
proposed to be restrained.'20 The court held that no extraordinary public interest
in immediate access existed because the case did not involve a public official

113. NebraskaPress,427 U.S. at 569-70.
114. Floyd Abrams, PriorRestraints,in 3 PRACISING LAW INsT., COMMUNICATIONS
LAwv 35, 39 (1997).
115. 686 P.2d 456 (Utah 1984).
116. See id. at 458-59.
117. See id. at 462. The facts found by the court included: (1) unsequestered jurors
were contacted during the trial and told that the defendants were connected to the Mafia; (2) the
media had refused requests for voluntary constraint; (3) the information regarding purported
organized crime connections was "not in the public domain," id. at 460, and there had been no
facts presented supporting the allegation; and (4) associating the defendantwith organized crime
would be prejudicial. See id. at 459-60.
118. Rejected alternatives included: "(1) defendant's waiver of a jury trial, (2)
sequestration of the jury, (3) voluntary restraint [by the media], and (4) continued admonitions
to the jury [to disregard any outside information]." Id.at 459-60. The most obvious alternative,
sequestration, was rejected because the expected length of the trial (four weeks) would create
a hardship on the jurors, would be costly, and might prejudice the jurors against the defendant.
See id.at 460. Utah Supreme Court Justice Stewart, in his dissent, rejected this argumentbecause
it would apply to any lengthy trial. See id. at 463 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
119. Id. at 461-62 (quoting UTAH CONST. art. , § 15) (alteration in original).
120. Id.
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or official misconduct.' 2' The record reveals no further appellate consideration.
Other than KUTV, no court upheld a prior restraint order against
publishing information already in the hands of the media for fifteen years after
Nebraska Press.' 2 Instead, First Amendment and Sixth Amendment conflicts
were litigated in cases preventing media access to the information, including
attending and reporting court proceedings. What the press "sees and hears in
the courtroom it may, like any other citizen, publish or report consistent with
the First Amendment."'" However, the press and public may, in limited
circumstances, be kept from seeing or hearing matters that transpire in the
courtroom. The principles and circumstances that would justify denying the
press and public access to court proceedings are illustrative of the narrow
reasoning which would support a prior restraint against publication.
In GannettCo. v. DePasquale2 4 the Supreme Court in a 5-4 opinion
held that, at the defendant's request, a court can close a pretrial hearing to
adjudicate the admissibility of an allegedly involuntary confession. 121
Delivering the opinion ofthe Court, Justice Stewart noted approvingly that "the
trial court balanced the 'constitutional rights of the press and the public' against
the 'defendants' right to a fair trial.' 126 Abatement of the press's constitutional
right was justified because a "reasonableprobability of prejudice" to the
defendants existed. 27 Therefore, protecting the defendant from public
disclosure ofan alleged confession was a sufficient basis to restrict the media's
right of access to the trial. Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent in Gannett,
specifically concurred with earlier decisions that would have restricted

121. See id. at 462. In what certainly was a result unexpected by the petitioning news
media, the Utah Supreme Court actually expanded the trial court's order. Citing Nebraska
Press's third prong that any order must be effective in preventing odious prejudice, the Utah
Supreme Court amended the order to also prohibit publishing any information about any
"indirect" Mafia connection, as well as any "direct" connection as prohibited in the original
order. Id. at 461. For a more in depth discussion of this case, see Scott A. Hagen, Note, KUTV
v. Wilkinson: Another Episode in the FairTrial/FreePress Saga, 1985 UTAH L. REv. 739
(1985).
122. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
123. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,446 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring
and dissenting);see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,362-63 (1966) C'[T]here is nothing
that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom."); Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532,541-42 (1965) ("[Members of the press] are always present if they wish to be and
are plainly free to report whatever occurs in open court through their respective media.").
124. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
125. Id. at 394.
126. Id. at 392.
127. Id. at 393 (emphasis added). The Gannett majority refused to decide whether the
press and the public had a constitutional right to attend criminal trials. See id. at 392. Justice
Powell concurred separately to opine that the press and public did have such a constitutional
right. However, in so holding he agreed that restricting the press is justified if the defendant
makes "some showing" of likely prejudice, and the press is given the opportunity to show
alternative measures, short of closure, which would "eliminate the dangers shown" to the
defendant's interests by a probable cause showing of potential prejudice to the defendant. Id. at
401 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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publication of defendants' confessions and offers to plead guilty. 128 Preventing
pretrial disclosure of a confession is a specific example of protecting a
defendant's rights against the rights of the press.
The Gannett Court reaffirmed that "a trial judge has an affirmative
constitutional duty to minimize the effects ofprejudicial pretrial publicity. And
because of the Constitution's pervasive concern for these due process rights,
a trial judge may surely take protective measures even when they are not
strictly and inescapably necessary."'" It follows, therefore, that a trial court has
more leeway to prevent a poisoned trial environment (an affirmative
constitutional duty) than limiting itself only to those Sheppard and Nebraska
Press alternatives which remain available after the environment has been
poisoned. 3 '
More recently, in Gentilev. StateBar 3 ' the Supreme Court reinforced
the importance of preventative measures rather than reliance on remediation:
Few, if any, interests under the Constitution
are more fundamental than the right to a fair
trial by "impartial" jurors, and an outcome

128. See id. at 444 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Blackmun
agreed that pretrial disclosure "of information, determined to be inadmissible at trial, may
severely affect a defendant's rights." Id. at 439 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). Such
information "may harm irreparably, under certain circumstances, the ability of a defendant to
obtain a fair trial." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). Among the several examples
Justice Blackmun listed as legitimate subordination of the free press to other values, he noted
that confidentiality of the contents of intercepted communications could be protected until the
lawfulness of the interception was ascertained. See id. at 439-40 (Blackmun, J., concurring and
dissenting). All of this "illustrate[s] that courts have been willing to permit limited exceptions
to the principle of publicity where necessary to protect some other interest." Id. at 440
(Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Blackmun also distinguished between
disclosures of "the contents of a confession or of a wiretap, or the nature of the evidence seized"
on the one hand, and adjudication of the issues regarding how the disputed evidence was
obtained on the other. Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). He suggested that
carefully crafted proceedings would protect the right of a free press to report the latter, while still
maintaining confidentiality to protect the defendant's rights in the former. See id. (Blackmun,
J., concurring and dissenting).
129. Id. at 378 (citation omitted).
130. Gannett affords useful analogies to the Quattlebaumquandary. Both cases deal
with the conflict between the First Amendment rights of a free press and a defendant's right to
a fair trial, both address pretrial publicity where the potential jury pool cannot be shielded, and
both involve thepotential release ofspecifically defined, potentially very damaging information.
Both also pertain to information to which the public and the press did not have an independent
right (suppression hearing transcripts in Gannett, attorney-client privileged communication in
Quattlebaum),and in both cases the defense and prosecution each agreed to the court's proposed
action. See id. at 375; Record on Appeal at 40 State-Record Co. v. State (Quattlebaum), 332 S.C.
346,504 S.E.2d 592 (1998), cert.denied,119 S. Ct. 1355 (1999) (No. 95-GS-32-0669). Finally,
both cases deal with the opportunities available to courts to implement very narrow and specific
prophylactic measures to prevent undue and unnecessary prejudice rather than attempts to
mitigate prejudice.
131. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
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affected by extrajudicial statements would
violate that fundamental right. Even if a fair
trial can ultimately be ensured through voir
dire, change of venue, or some other
device, these measures entail serious costs
to the system. Extensive voir dire may not
be able to filter out all of the effects of
pretrial publicity, and with increasingly
widespread media coverage of criminal
trials, a change of venue may not suffice to
undo the effects of statements such as those
made by petitioner.'3 2
As summarizedby the Quattlebaumcourt, the SheppardandNebraska
Pressmeasures for maintaining an impartial jury impose tremendous costs on
the defendant, the courts, and the public and have questionable effectiveness.' 33
The importance of the right to an impartial jury, the potentially devastating
effect of especially aggravating, non-admissible information, and the
shortcomings and costs of the so-called "remedial measures," can, though only
rarely, reach that critical mass where a defendant's right to an impartial jury
outweighs the press's right to publish especially aggravating, prejudicial
information.M Yet, criminal defendants not only have the right to impartial
juries in order to obtain fair trials, they also have other rights, both
constitutional and constitutionally based, that are endemic to the American
justice system. Part V discusses these rights and their impact on facts such as
those found in Quattlebaum.
V.

NARROWING THE SCOPE: A FREE PRESS, FAIR TRIALS, AND THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Two amendments to the United States Constitution specifically
delineate four "private rights" guaranteed to every citizen whose life, liberty,
or freedom are at stake in a criminal trial. Those rights are (1) the Fifth
132. Id. at 1075.
133. See Quattlebaum,332 S.C. at 355 n.1 8,356 n.19, 504 S.E.2d at 597 nn.l 8 & 19.
134. The NebraskaPress Court explicitly recognized this possibility:
However difficult it may be, we need not rule out the
possibility of showing the kind of threat to fair trial
rights that would possess the requisite degree of
certainty [ofirreparable prejudice] tojustify restraint.
This Court has frequently denied that First
Amendment rights are absolute and has consistently
rejected the proposition that a prior restraint can
never be employed.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,569-70 (1976), quoted in Quattlebaum, 332 S.C.
at 355, 504 S.E.2d at 597.
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Amendment right against self-incrimination;1 35 (2) the Fifth Amendment right
to due process; 36 (3) the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial that is speedy,
public, and tried by an impartial, local jury; 37 and (4) the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel for that trial.131 The importance and
application of these four rights exist independently of one another, and each is
a vital part of the Bill of Rights. 39 A fair trial depends on the unmitigated
quality of each of these rights. Yet, prior to 1990 nearly every historical
reference to the right to a "fair trial" focused solely on the right to an "impartial
jury" without addressing the criminal defendant's other three specific
constitutional rights that are essential for a fair trial.
In 1990, the three other constitutional elements required for a fair
trial-due process, the right against involuntary self-incrimination, and
effective assistance ofcounsel--coalesced in a media challenge to the attorneyclient privilege of confidentiality. Cable News Network (CNN) obtained
audiotapes of telephone conversations held between Panamanian General
Manuel Noriega and his defense counsel while Noriega was detained in a
Florida federal prison awaiting trial."4 The tapes were made by prison officials
and then obtained by CNN through unknown means."'4 On a motion by defense
counsel, the district court ordered CNN to produce the tape and to restrain from

135. "No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ..... U.S. CONsT. amend.V.
136. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
oflaw.... "Id.
137. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed ..... Id. amend. VI.
138. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
139. It is possible to maintain protection against self-incrimination and still not have
a fair trial. It is possible to enjoy effective assistance of counsel and still not have a fair trial. It
is possible to have a speedy and public trial and still not have a fair trial. And it is possible to
empanel an impartial, local jury and still not have a fair trial.
140. See United States v. Noriega (Noriega II), 917 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1990)
(per curiam).
141. See id.In its initial hearing where it issued the order, the district court deferred
the extensive evidentiary hearing that would have been required to determine if the attorneyclient privilege had been waived and assumed that the privilege had notbeenwaived. See United
States v. Noriega (Noriega I1), 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Nevertheless, the
Eleventh Circuit assumed that Noriega had signed a valid release reflecting his understanding
that the prison officials would be recording all conversations, including those with his attorney.
See Noriega II, 917 F.2d at 1551. The court noted that such a release to one element of the
government (the prison) did not necessarily serve as a release to another element (the
prosecutor). See id.at 1551 n.10. In subsequentproceedings, the district court found that General
Noriega's "release" specifically stated that "[c]alls to an attorney, made according to the rules,
[would] not be monitored" and that the prison's associate warden assured Noriega's counsel that
maintaining the attorney-client privilege would not be a problem. Noriega II, 752 F. Supp. at
1047.
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publishing its contents until they were reviewed by a magistrate.' In its
decision, the district court held that the attorney-client privilege, though not a
constitutional right, assumes a constitutional aspect to effectuate a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.'43 The
privilege serves two purposes-to allow uninhibited communication between
the defendant and counsel and to prevent disclosure of information contained
in such communications that would damage the case.'" Finding that the first
purpose was already impeded because Noriega knew the conversations were
monitored, the district court restricted the issue to CNN's right to publish
versus Noriega's right to a fair trial (omitting consideration of Noriega's right
to private communication with his defense counsel). 4 However, the threat of
prejudice to Noriega's right to a fair trial was sufficient enough to impose a
temporary restraint pending review of the tapes, especially because the tapes
could have revealed trial strategy and protected confidences."
CNN petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for relief.'47 In a per curiam
decision dated only one day after the original order, the Eleventh Circuit
refused to stay the order. 4 s In its decision, the court considered freedom of the
press, fair trial, privacy, and attorney-client privilege issues. Noting the
obligation of trial judges to effectuate the fair-trial guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit, citing the Second Circuit's statement that
"[w]hen the exercise of free press rights actually tramples upon Sixth
Amendment rights, the former must nonetheless yield to the latter,"' 49 granted
broad discretion to trial judges to place restrictions on persons involved in
proceedings "despite the fact that such restrictions might affect First
Amendment considerations."' 0 But the Eleventh Circuit eschewed the
NebraskaPressthree-pronged test. Instead, it applied the standards for closing

142. United States v. Noriega (Noriega 1), 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1034-35, 1036 (S.D.
Fla.), aft'd, 917 F.2d 1543 (1lth Cir. 1990) (per curiam). The district judge ordered the tapes
to be reviewed by a magistrate, instead of by himself, so thathe would nothave to recuse himself
because of exposure to privileged attorney-client communications. Id. at 1034-35.
143. See id. at 1033.
144. See id.
145. See id. Though unstated by the district court, at the time of this decision, most
courts would nothave applied the privilege to any communication that had been revealed to third
parties not encompassed by the privilege, including eavesdroppers and thieves. See GRAHAM C.
LILLY, ANINTRODUCTIONTOTHELAWOFEVIDENCE § 9.6, at456 (3d ed. 1996). In modem times,
courts are becoming less draconian as to "stolen" communications, and even to some
inadvertently released communications, and the Advisory Committee Notes to the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence would protect the privilege against eavesdroppers and thieves. See
id. § 9.6, at 457 (citing FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(4), (b), &advisory committee's note).
146. See Noriega 1, 752 F. Supp. at 1034-35.
147. United States v. Noriega (Noriega 11), 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam).
148. See id. at 1552.
149. In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir. 1988), cited in Noriega1I,
917 F.2d at 1548.
150. NoriegaII, 917 F.2d at 1548.
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a hearing from Press-EnterpriseCo. v. SuperiorCourt(Press-Enterprise
i0),' s
which require "first,... a substantial probability that the defendant's right to
a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure[, in this case being prior
restraint,] would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot
adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights. 1'5 2 Although the Eleventh
Circuit was faced with CNN's refusal to produce the tapes, and thus neither it
nor the district court could review their contents, 3 the court found that the
threat of prejudice from revealing private, attorney-client communications
merited restraint based solely on the character of the communications, even
without consideration of their actual contents."5 4 The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.'
VI.

THE QUA7TzEBAUM DECISION: RECONCILING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
FORCES

CNN's conduct inNoriegavindicated Justice Stevens's deciding vote
in NebraskaPressto refuse to extend constitutional protection to anything the
media may covet publishing "no matter how shabby or illegal the means by
which the information is obtained, [and] no matter how serious an intrusion on
privacy might be involved."'5 6 The Quattlebaum videotape illustrates that
Noriegais not an isolated event. ' 7 While the precedents and guidance from the
United States Supreme Court have been muddled, the South Carolina Supreme
Court answered the issue by faithfully discerning what the highest Court
has-and has not-previously held.
The media petitioners in Quattlebaum asked the court to choose
between the media's First Amendment publication rights and Quattlebaum's
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.'5s The Quattlebaum court noted that the
Nebraska Press Court declined to assign priorities between freedom of the

151. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
152. Id. at 14; see Noriega11, 917 F.2d at 1549.
153. The court chastised CNN for asking for the court's relief while refusing to
provide the court the information necessary to balance the interests. See Noriega11, 917 F.2d at
1547, 1552.
154. See id. at 1552.
155. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990). Justices Marshall
and O'Connor would have granted the stay application and the petition for certiorari due to the
"extraordinary consequence for freedom of the press." Id. at 976 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Subsequently, the district court denied the issuance of a permanent injunction. See United States
v. Noriega (Noriega 11), 752 F. Supp. at 1045, 1054 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
156. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 617 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
157. Noriega is the only case prior to Quattlebaum involving media disclosure of
attorney-client privileged communication. State-Record Co. v. State (Quattlebaum), 332 S.C.
346, 350 n.1 1, 504 S.E.2d 592, 594 n.11 (1998), cert.denied, 119 S. Ct. 1355 (1999).
158. See Quattlebaum,332 S.C. at 350, 504 S.E.2d at 594.
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press and the right to a fair trial '59 and specifically refused to ban all prior
restraints which might be needed to protect fair trial rights. 6 The majority in
Quattlebaum could conceive of no other type of situation in which a
defendant's right to a fair trial could be so jeopardized, and so preventable, as
in the case before it.'6 ' Either a prior restraint was justified under the
circumstances found in Quattlebaum,orprior restraints could never bejustified
under any circumstances.' 62 Because the United States Supreme Court "has
consistently rejected the proposition that a prior restraint can never be
employed,"' 63 the Quattlebaum court correctly held that a prior restraint was
justified to prevent publication of the privileged conversation between a
criminal defendant and his defense counsel.
In reaching its conclusion, the Quattlebaumcourt paid homage to the
NebraskaPressthree-pronged test.' The court easily disposed of the first and
third prongs, holding that the publication would be highly prejudicial and that
the restraint would effectively prevent that prejudice.16 5 As to the second prong,
the court found that the Supreme Court's refusal to ban all prior restraints was
irreconcilable with its seemingly literal requirement to find that no other
measures "would be likely to mitigate" the prejudice. 6 6 Mitigate means only
to "lessen," not necessarily to eliminate. 67 Therefore, any action by the court,
no matter how meaningless, would to some degree "mitigate" prejudice
regardless of its remaining virulence. The Quattlebaum court concluded that
the Nebraska Press Court left intact trial courts' responsibility to ensure
criminal defendants fair trials. 68 Trial courts sit to guarantee fair trials, not
merely to strive for them. Without rejecting the Nebraska Press test, the
Quattlebaum court found it irrelevant to the circumstances before it. 6 9 The
Quattlebaum court concluded that any other measures might have "alleviated"
the prejudice, but could never guarantee Quattlebaum's right to a fair trial. 7 0

159. See id. at 351-52, 504 S.E.2d at 595.
160. See id. at 355, 504 S.E.2d at 596-97.
161. See id. at 358-59, 504 S.E.2d at 598-99. The court hinted at the nature of the
attorney-client conversations contained in the recording by protesting that it was "impossible...
to accurately portray the potential prejudice to Quattlebaum" without actually disclosing the
contents of the videotape. Id. at 358 n.23, 504 S.E.2d at 598 n.23.
162. Id. at 358, 504 S.E.2d at 598-99.
163. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976), quoted in
Quattlebaum,332 S.C. at 355, 504 S.E.2d at 597.
164. See Quattlebaum,332 S.C. at 353-56, 504 S.E.2d at 595-97.
165. See id. at 353-54, 504 S.E.2d at 596.
166. See id. at 354 n.16, 504 S.E.2d at 596 n.16.
167. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1002 (6th ed. 1990).

168. See Quattlebaum,332 S.C. at 355, 504 S.E.2d at 597.
169. See id. at 356, 504 S.E.2d at 597 (stating that the United States Supreme Court
did not intend for the right to a fair trial to be jeopardized by the media's disclosure of attorneyclient privileged conversations).
170. See id. at 353 n.14, 356, 504 S.E.2d at 596 n.14, 597. The Quattlebaum court
effectively adopted the Irvin, Rideau, and Estes doctrine that some threats to a fair trial are so
inherently prejudicial as to mandate summary judicial action without requiring a finding that the
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The South Carolina Supreme Court resisted the temptation to cite
Noriega as a carte blanche license to approve the prior restraint involved in
Quattlebaum. However, the Quattlebaum court could find comfort (if not
refuge) in its knowledge that the trial court in Noriega issued its restraining
order without any preliminary showing of specific prejudice as required by the
Nebraska Press test. 7' The Supreme Court's decision to leave the Noriega
order undisturbed supported the Quattlebaum court's departure from blind,
72
literal application of the Nebraska Presstest in all circumstances. The court
found it was not limited by Nebraska Press where the publication to be
restrained consisted of attorney-client privileged communications because
divulging such communications to the public jeopardizes defendants' Sixth
right to an
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel as well as their
173
trial.
fair
a
to
right
their
of
aspects
separate
jury-two
impartial
Justice Toal delivered the sole dissent to the Quattlebaum decision
upholding the prior restraint. 74 Justice Toal prefaced the dissent by describing
the benign nature of the restraint being appealed: It was not a "restraint of the
expression of an opinion[, and it was] not a permanent restraint on the
publication of the attorney-client conference."' 7 She also noted that the
Constitution's Framers restricted only the legislative branch from restricting
free speech and a free press; 76 the Supreme Court did not extend the
prohibition to judicial prior restraints until 1968 when it struck down ajudicial
order forbidding public rallies by a white supremacist organization. 77 Justice
Toal joined the majority in questioning whether courts are required to use the

prejudice had been mitigated. The Nebraska PressCourt did not overrule this line of cases and
indeed found them "instructive." See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551-54
(1976). The right to a fair trial, in these cases, was preeminent and not subject to surrogates. The
Quattlebaumcourt did not analyze the specific alternatives suggested as "remedial" measures
in Sheppard and proposed as "alternative" measures in Nebraska Press.Instead, the court
chronicled the shortcomings inherent in each oftheproposed alternatives. See Quattlebaum,332
S.C. at 355 n.18, 504 S.E.2d at 597 n.18.
171. See Quattlebaum,332 S.C. at 357, 504 S.E.2d at 598.
172. See id. at 356-57, 504 S.E.2d at 597-98.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 359-70, 504 S.E.2d at 599-605 (Toal, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Toal concurred with the majority's discussion ofsubject matterjurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction, and she dissented as to the validity of the prior restraint. See id. (Toal, J., concurring
and dissenting).
at 359, 504 S.E.2d at 599 (Toal, J., concurring and dissenting).
175. See id.
(Toal, J., concurring and dissenting); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I
176. See id.
("Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ......
(emphasis added).
177. See Quattlebaum,332 S.C. at 360 n.2, 504 S.E.2d at 599 n.2 (Toal, J., concurring
and dissenting); see also Carroll v. President &Comm'rs ofPrincess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
In Carrollthe Court reemphasized the presumptive unconstitutionality of any prior restraint, but
acknowledged thatjudicial prior restrains could be necessary, as long as procedural safeguards
prevent the dangers of a system of censorship. See id. at 181.
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same analysis (the NebraskaPress test) in assessing all judicial restraints. "8
Specifically, she asked if it matters whether, in addition to preventing
premature publicity about issues to be considered during a trial, a court "seeks
to safeguard such constitutional values ... as the protection against selfincrimination, the right to an attorney of the defendant's choosing, and the right
to a speedy trial."' 79 However, although she forecasted an approach more
sympathetic to the right to a fair trial, Justice Toal decided that judicial
precedents mandated otherwise. 0
Justice Toal agreed with the majority opinion that Nebraska Press
8
provides an inadequate standard for evaluating cases such as Quattlebaum.11
After also agreeing that the second prong of the NebraskaPresstest cannot be
read in isolation, she rejected the majority's abandonment of the test under
these circumstances, recognizing instead that it should be applied as a
balancing test, having the court consider the degree to which other measures
might mitigate the adverse effects of pretrial publicity.' However, as Justice
Toal acknowledged, this purported "balancing" test is in fact weighed almost
totally against the criminal defendant. 3
Criminal defendants have "'the heavy burden of demonstrating, in
advance of trial, that without prior restraint a fair trial will be denied.""' Yet
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury is the government's
obligation, not the accused's.' 85 The burden always remains on the court to
guarantee a fair trial, not on the defendant. But the dissenting opinion in
Quattlebaumsuggests that unless the defendant proves under NebraskaPress
that the defendant will be denied a fair trial, a prior restraint cannot be imposed.
The dissenting opinion justifies this outcome because prior restraints on the
press are immediate and profound, whereas the prejudice to the defendant and
the criminal justice system is only a matter of probability.18 6 Yet even a
"probability" of an unfair trial is unacceptable.' 87 Furthermore, Justice Toal
178. See Quattlebaum, 332 S.C. at 360, 504 S.E.2d at 599-600 (Toal, J., concurring
and dissenting).
concurring and dissenting).
179. Id. at 360, 504 S.E.2d at 600 (Toal, J.,
180. See id.at 361,368,504 S.E.2d at 600, 604 (Toal,J., concurring and dissenting).
181. See id.
at 368, 504 S.E.2d at 604 (Toal, J., concurring and dissenting).
182. See id.
at 363, 504 S.E.2d at 601 (Toal, J., concurring and dissenting).
concurring and dissenting) ("The
183. See id.at 364, 504 S.E.2d at 601 (Toal, J.,
presumption ...is heavily in favor of using alternative measures.").
184. Id. (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976)).
185. See United States v. Noriega (Noriega I1), 917 F.2d 1543, 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990)

(per curiam).
186. Quattlebaum, 332 S.C. at 368, 504 S.E.2d at 603 (Toal, J., concurring and
dissenting). The dissent did not overtly disagree with the majority's conclusion that, "[a]lthough
other measures may have... mitigated the effects of pretrial publicity, the only measure certain
to ensure Quattlebaum's fundameital right to a fair trial was imposition of the prior restraint."
Id. at 353 n.14, 504 S.E.2d at 596 n.14.
187. "A forecast of future difficulty is by definition uncertain, but equally uncertain
is the rejection of that forecast. ...It is better to err, if err we must, on the side of generosity in
the protection of a defendant's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury." Belo Broad. Corp.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss4/11

26

Callahan: Professional Responsibility

1999]

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

1021

recognized that it is unrealistic for a trial court to make detailed findings on all
available alternatives, as Nebraska Press seems to require. 8 "If a trial judge
has to eliminate all other alternatives (a crystal ball exercise since none of the
'alternatives' will have been put into play), then in reality there exists an
absolute prohibition against any prior restraint."'" 9 Such a requirement would
diminish a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial from a guarantee to a
probability, enabling society to impose on the individual citizen (the criminal
defendant) the entire cost of society's generalized interest in absolute freedom
of the press. However, our political system rests on the premise of individual
dignity." All members of society must share equally in the costs of
maintaining societal interests and must not place the burden on any one citizen.
Justice Toal interpreted Nebraska Press as an absolute prohibition
against any prior restraints even though the Supreme Court specifically rejected
such an interpretation. 9 ' She found that the NebraskaPressCourt "effectively
established the constitutional doctrine that the First Amendment trumps the
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments."'"
Justice Toal also asserted that protecting the attorney-client privilege
is significant only to the extent that the conversation may be revealed to the
prosecution, that any potential revelation will be prejudicial, and that no other
less intrusive alternatives would be available to mitigate the expected
prejudicial revelation. 93 By implication, if restraining publication would not
prevent the material from falling into the prosecution's hands (as it already had
in Quattlebaum),194 then no reason to restrain publication exists. Justice Toal
reached this conclusion by examining the inquiry purportedly mandated by the
Eleventh Circuit in Noriegaff,95 but this mandate is illusory. 96 The Eleventh

v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423,431 (5thCir. Unit AAug. 1981); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 362 (1966) ("[T]rial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never
weighed against the accused.").
188. Quattlebaum, 332 S.C. at 361, 504 S.E.2d at 600 (Toal, J., concurring and
dissenting).
189. Id. (Toal, J., concurring and dissenting).
190. See Irvinv. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,721 (1961) (stating that trial byjury is the most
priceless safeguard for the preservation of "individual liberty and the dignity and worth of every

man").
191. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1976) ("However
difficult it may be, we need not rule out the possibility of showing the kind of threat to fair trial
rights that would possess the requisite degree of certainty to justify restraint.").
192. Quattlebaum, 332 S.C. at 361, 504 S.E.2d at 600 (Toal, J., concurring and
dissenting).
concurring and dissenting).'
193. See id. at 369-70, 504 S.E.2d at 604-05 (Toal, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("The
194. See id. at 361, 504 S.E.2d at 600 (Toal, J.,
prosecution retained the tape for over a year unbeknownst to defendant or his lawyer.").
concurring and dissenting).
195. See id. at 369, 504 S.E.2d at 604 (Toal, J.,
196. The confusion derives in part from Justice Toal's reliance on a misapplication
of the district court's summary of the language actually employed by the Eleventh Circuit and
partially from Justice Toal's attributing to the Eleventh Circuit a doctrine that emanated solely
from the district court. She quoted: "'[T]he fact that conversations may or may not fall within

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

27

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 11
1022

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50: 995

Circuit did not constrain the inquiry to whether the confidential conversations
would be revealed to the prosecution. The district court judge in NoriegaIII
proposed this test. He did not attribute it to the Eleventh Circuit, and the
Eleventh Circuit did not address it.'9 7 Justice Toal was certainly justified in
raising an issue presented by an esteemed federal district judge, but attributing
the mandated inquiry to the Eleventh Circuit was a mistake.' 8
By focusing solely on the actual prejudice to one specific defendant,
Justice Toal overlooked the irreparable damage to the judicial system that
permitting the press to divulge attorney-client confidences would cause. In
Noriega Ithe Eleventh Circuit stated that "[t]he purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to encourage open and complete communication between a client
and his attorney by eliminating the possibility of subsequent compelled
disclosure of their confidential communications."'" If defendants cannot trust
their confidences to be kept secret, then the privilege serves no purpose, and the
broader public interests are sacrificed. Not only will the defense counsel be
unable to defend competently their clients in contested trials, but they would
also be unable to advise their clients when pleading guilty or when otherwise
cooperating with the prosecution might be appropriate. Therefore, even if a
restraint on publication would not prevent the prosecution's access to
confidential material in a case such as Quattlebaum, failure to restrain the

the protections of the [attorney-client] privilege has no bearing on whether Noriega's right to an
impartial jury will be clearly and irreparably harmed by publication."' Id. (Toal, J., concurring
and dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Noriega (Noriega III), 752 F.
Supp. 1045, 1051 (S.D. Fla. 1990)). The district court quoted by Justice Toal cited the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion, but the Eleventh Circuit actually stated: "Even if the attorney-client
communications in this case were determined not to be privileged, the District Court may decide
that the disclosure of these communications would constitute an impediment to Noriega's fair
trial." United States v. Noriega (Noriega I), 917 F.2d 1543, 1549-50 (11 th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam). The Eleventh Circuit suggested that factors supporting aprior restraint include"whether
the matter under scrutiny historically has been open to the press and the public" and noted that
communications between a criminal defendant and his defense counsel have historically been
deemed private, even where they may not be privileged. Id. at 1547 n.6. Therefore, as the
district court properly noted, the material may be restrained from publication even if it is not
privileged. See NoriegaIII, 752 F. Supp. at 1051.
197. The remainder of the quote cited by Justice Toal does limit the inquiry to the
impact of the prosecution learning the contents of the privileged conversations: 'Guaranteeing
Noriega's right to counsel involves an equally serious but much narrowerinquiry. There, the
court is concerned only with the extent to which the publication of legitimately privileged
communications would prejudice Noriega's defense were those protected conversations to fall
into the hands of the prosecution."' Quattlebaum, 332 S.C. at 369, 504 S.E.2d at 604 (Toal, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (quoting Noriega111, 752 F. Supp. at 1051-52). This part ofthe quote
from the district court is not attributed to the Eleventh Circuit.
198. In determining whether the restraint should be issued solely because of the
"privileged" nature of the conversation, the Eleventh Circuit would inquire only as to whether
the client intended the conversation to remain confidential and whether the client actually
understood and could reasonably expect, under the circumstances, that the conversation would
remain confidential. See Noriega 11, 917 F.2d at 1551.
199. Id. at 1550.
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media from publishing attorney-client confidences would severely jeopardize
society's interest in the free flow of communication necessary for attorneys to
provide sound advice to their clients.
Justice Toal remained silent regarding anironic aspect of Quattlebaum
that implicates the policy of the attorney-client privilege. If the defendant had
not been protected by the attorney-client privilege guaranteed by the judicial
system, the defendant most likely would not have engaged in the conversation
which the media sought to expose. In other words, without the privilege, the
conversation would not have existed.2" If the media could not have possessed
the information but for the unique attributes of the judicial system which
fostered its creation, then the First Amendment should not guarantee the media
the right to publish that information.2"' The correct inquiry in balancing societal
interests with the freedom of the press is whether the judicial process, which
both generates the information and seeks to restrict its publication, furthers 'an
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of
expression' and whether 'the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no
greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular
governmental interest involved.""'2 2
Justice Toal also implied that once the media possess any information,
courts are powerless to prevent them from publishing it.2" 3 Yet legislative,
judicial, and executive prior restraints of the press abound. The press can be
prohibited from publishing copyrighted material in order to protect a private
citizen's property interests in that material. 204 The Federal Trade Commission
can prohibit the publication of advertising considered contrary to the public
interest.20 And the state can legislatively prohibit the publication of
photographs that expose a race to contempt on the theory that such publication
may be libelous or conducive to a breach of the peace.20 6 The importance of
these interests both to individuals and to society at large is pale in comparison
200. This is a reason the attorney-client privilege does not truly hamper a prosecutor
from obtaining evidence-there is no evidence but for the privilege. See Swidler & Berlin v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2086-87 (1998). The prosecutor's loss is "more apparent than
real," id. at 2087, and so is the media's loss in Quattlebaum.
201. Cf.Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (upholding a trial court's
granting of discovery to a newspaper regarding a religious organization and its leaders who had
sued the newspaper, but prohibiting the newspaper from publishing any information so obtained
until and unless the information was admitted during trial proceedings).
202. Id. at 32 (alteration in original) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
413 (1974)).
203. State-Record Co. v. State (Quattlebaum), 332 S.C. 346,367,504 S.E.2d 592,603
(1998) (Toal, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[W]hileit maybepermissible for a court to restrict
some First Amendment freedoms [e.g., gag orders on court officials and parties] in order to
protect a defendant's right to a fair trial, it is almost never acceptable for a court to impose a
prior restraint."), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1355 (1999).
204. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (involving the
unlawful appropriation of a performer's act).
205. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
206. See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
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to the rights to a fair trial with an impartial jury, to effective assistance of
counsel, and to constraining involuntary self-incrimination.
Justice Toal's dissent in Quattlebaum summarizes the absolutist
approach to the First Amendment, but the majority opinion in Quattlebaum
adheres more closely to the Supreme Court's long tradition of enforcing the
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial as well as the specific principles of
Nebraska Press. To do so, the majority carefully, but not tortuously,
distinguished the facts and the applicable law in Quattlebaum from Nebraska
Press. Part VII of this Note seeks to make that task easier for future courts.
VII.

A PER SE STANDARD TO PROTECT ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENCES

The majority in Quattlebaumstruggled with the Nebraska Presstest,
considered its application to be "uncertain" following the Noriega case, and
expressed hope that the United States Supreme Court would develop an
alternative standard." 7 The dissent likewise expressed frustration with not
having "a more suitable test."208 The United States Supreme Court need not
overrule Nebraska Press in order to develop a more specific standard
applicable to the unique circumstances in which a defendant seeks to enjoin
media publication of attorney-client confidences. But until the Court develops
such a standard, the following steps for protecting the interests of both the
public and criminal defendants might be useful.
The practical effect of Noriega is a new rule narrowly applicable to
between criminal defendants and their attorneys.' 9
communications
private
Once a criminal defendant has made a prima facie case that the information
sought to be published is a private communication with defense counsel, then
its prejudicial effect on the defendant's right to a fair trial under the Sixth
Amendment is presumed to outweigh any right of the press to publish the
information under the First Amendment.
The media remain free to publish whatever they wish until and unless
a threatened party files an action to prevent publication of specific information
endangering that party's constitutional rights.2" 0 That party would have the
burden of making a prima facie showing that (1) criminal prosecution is
pending; (2) the contents of private, attorney-client communications related to
that prosecution are in the hands of a third party, particularly a media outlet,
without consent or authority; and (3) there exists reasonable cause to believe
207. See Quattlebaum,332 S.C. at 357, 358, 504 S.E.2d at 598.
208. Id. at 368, 504 S.E.2d at 604 (Toal, J., concurring and dissenting).
209. The author does not necessarily exclude application ofthe rule to civil cases, but
limits its justification here to the constitutional guarantees afforded criminal defendants.
210. Thus, a criminal defendant facing loss ofproperty, imprisonment, or even death
would be on at least an equal footing with a publisher seeking to protect its economic interests
in copyrighted material. See generallyEugene Volokh &Brett McDonnell, Freedomof Speech
and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431 passim (1998)
(discussing the interplay between copyright law and the right to free speech).
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that the third party may disseminate the information. The burden then rightfully
falls on the third party (the media), not on the defendant. If the third party fails
to demonstrate that the communication does not fall within the ambit of
attorney-client-privileged communications under the jurisdiction's rules, then
the publication may be restrained until such time that the communication is no
longer privileged. If the media succeed in demonstrating that the material is not
protected by the attorney-client privilege, then the burden shifts to the movant
(the criminal defendant) to demonstrate that other constitutional interests and
rights outweigh the media's free press rights.2 '
To determine if confidential but non-privileged communications may
be published, the court should evaluate the competing interests (society's, the
defendant's, and the media's) using a test patterned after Noriega14,21 KUTV,
Inc. v. Wilkinson,'1 3 and the public interest inquiry in Procunierv. Martinez.1 4
The restraint on the media should be issued, if (1) there is a substantial
probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by the
publication of the private communication between the defendant and defense
counsel, (2) there is a substantial probability that restraining publication of the
private communication would prevent the prejudice that would otherwise
occur, and (3) the economic and noneconomic costs to the public and to the
defendant of alternative measures which otherwise would be necessary to
guarantee a fair trial outweigh the public's interest in the unhindered
publication of the information at issue. Either party would have the right to
appeal the decision,"' with the press entitled to automatic, expedited appellate
review. Criminal defendants would have standard appellate and extraordinary
writ procedures available.
Under the foregoing procedure, any communication still protected by
the attorney-client privilege will remain sacrosanct. This protection is essential
to maintain the institution of attorney-client privilege and the public interests
it serves. If the material is not protected by the attorney-client privilege, but is
otherwise a product of a confidential attorney-client relationship, then the
prejudicial impact of the contents would be a factor. In these cases, the burden
would fall on the defendant to demonstrate probable prejudice that could not
be, with a high degree of certainty, sufficiently mitigated by reasonable

211. To that end, public interests may also be weighed. Thus, the media may assert
the public's interest in a free press, and criminal defendants may assert the public's interest in
a fair and efficient trial system. Further, the media must show that any alternative measures will
not merely mitigate the prejudice, but will actually eliminate the dangers to the defendant's
rights. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 401 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
212. United States v. Noriega (Noriega 1), 917 F.2d 1543,1549 (11 th Cir. 1990) (per

curiam).
213. 686 P.2d 456,461-62 (Utah 1984).
214. 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
215. Independent review prevents prejudiced or erroneous deprivation of
constitutional rights by trial court fact-finders. Volokh & McDonnell, supranote 210, at 243 132.
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alternatives. Underno circumstances could the informationbe published unless
the court ensures that alternative measures are taken to guarantee the defendant
a fair trial.
VIii.

CONCLUSION

The freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights normally coexist
quietly, serving as a collection of solid foundations upon which the American
experiment is constructed. The First Amendment guarantees not only that
individuals may speak their minds, but ensures the public a free press to share
and to disseminate knowledge, opinions, and ideas. The primary purpose of the
First Amendment is self-preservation of the public's liberty by assuring free
discourse on the affairs of the government. The most certain guarantor of the
First Amendment is the press's freedom, on a daily basis, to publish whatever
it wishes without requiring prior approval from that government. But this
freedom is not a license to trample on individual rights which are guaranteed
by the Constitution in inks just as bold and words just as forceful as those in the
First Amendment.
Individual citizens have at least equal standing with the press to protect
their rights. Those rights include the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial that
is speedy, public, and held before an impartial, local jury with the effective
assistance of counsel. Unlike the press's freedomto publish, the Supreme Court
has consistently held these rights to be absolute.
The courts must seek a way to guarantee the respective rights of all
parties, which was the worthy objective of the Nebraska Presstest. But when
one right unavoidably clashes with another, the courts must balance society's
interests to determine which will prevail and which will yield. Society's
interest in the First Amendment is primarily the protection of freedom to know
and to criticize the affairs of government. Society's interests are equally
founded in a fair and effective judicial system centered on the Sixth
Amendment's unique imperative mandating that the government guarantee
every citizen a fair trial. Those two principles very rarely clash, but when they
do, the rights of individual citizens coupled with society's interest in fair trials
trumps even the press's right to disclose freely all aspects of governmental
corruption.
Other rights held by every citizen, beyond the right to an impartial
are
essential to fulfilling the guaranteed right to a fair trial. These include
jury,
the rights to due process, freedom from compulsory self-incrimination, and
effective assistance of counsel. All are jeopardized when any party, especially
the media, seeks to divulge the contents of attorney-client confidences.
Society's interests are especially servedby preserving notjust specific episodes
of individual citizens, but also by protecting the institutions that maintain the
fairness and effectiveness of the judicial system. The attorney-client privilege
is among those institutions.
The Quattlebaum majority effectively balanced these interests. It
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adhered to the principles found in the Supreme Court's long history of
protecting both First and Sixth Amendment rights, including those underlying
the Nebraska Press standard. It did so, though, by distinguishing the
extraordinary attempt to disclose unlawfully recorded, specific attorney-client
conversations from the NebraskaPresstest designed to adjudicate the threat of
massive, but generalized and lawfully obtained, pretrial publicity. Both the
majority and the dissent in Quattlebaum demonstrated Nebraska Press's
unwieldiness as a standard to be applied in all cases of pretrial publicity,
regardless of type or extent. The majority found ample reason to depart from
Nebraska Press.The dissent rightly dismissed the fiction that appellate courts
need not prioritize among conflicting rights and found justification to extend
Nebraska Press to its logical conclusion that prior restraints may never be
imposed to protect a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. This argument is
especially troubling because it singularly sacrifices the right to a fair trial to the
idol of a free press. Meanwhile, imposing restraints on the press continues to
be acceptable when necessary to spare pure property interests (copyrighted
material), the sensibilities of protected groups (hate speech), or the Federal
Trade Commission's paternal instincts regarding deceptive advertising. Each
of these interests is important, but they pale in comparison with the
constitutional right to a fair trial.
When communication covered by the attorney-client privilege is
publicly disclosed, far more thanjust an impartial jury is threatened. The Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination are both destroyed. The First Amendment,
though ostensibly inviolate, may be abridged or completely sacrificed to give
way to overwhelming competing public interests. In contrast, the right to a fair
trial has been consistently held to be absolute and preeminent over all other
considerations. The Nebraska Presstest remains appropriate when courts face
generalized, pervasive publicity, but is not helpful in dealing with specifically
limited, but potentially devastating, threatened disclosures.
Freedom of the press is a foundation of democracy. The right to a fair
trial is the keystone ofjustice. When these two impermeable principles clash,
defenders of freedom fear the very institution of liberty. The procedures and
standards suggested in Part VII afford a mechanism for courts to remain true
to the imperatives of both the First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment
without either constitutional imperative unnecessarily trampling on the
protections and rewards of the other.
James D. Callahan
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